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Far-right–inspired violence in the United States is on the rise (Perliger, 2013), andthere is a growing realization within policy circles of the increasing threat fromso-called “lone wolf” terrorists of different ideological hues (Simon, 2013). A more
in-depth understanding of individual offenders and their behaviors (both antecedent and
offense-commission) is therefore of great importance not only to the academic literature
but also for practitioners tasked with countering the problem. The need for such research
is also driven by the fact that a preponderance of studies have focused on violent Islamist
organizations for more than a decade. Given the nature of the threat presented by al-Qaeda,
this is understandable, but a side effect is that our understanding of the nature of far-right–
inspired homicide lags behind our understanding of the behaviors associated with analogous
movements.
Recognizing these features of the existing literature and the current security environ-
ment, Gruenewald, Chermak, and Freilich (2013, this issue) provide an empirical assess-
ment of the behavioral underpinnings of far-right–inspired homicide offenders and compare
group-based offenders with lone offenders. Gruenewald et al. (2013) test 23 hypotheses,
each of which is derived from a careful examination of the existing literature. Using infer-
ential statistics, they find several significant differences between lone and group offenders.
For example, the bivariate analysis suggests that compared with group offenders, far-right
lone offenders are statistically more likely to be unmarried, have experience of the military,
live alone, use firearms, select government targets, kill more people, and die in the com-
mission of their offense. The multivariate analysis also suggests that age and mental illness
also significantly distinguish lone offenders from group offenders (e.g., lone offenders are
typically older and more likely to have a history of mental illness).
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For the remainder of this essay, we consider the salient issues in the available relevant
literature in relation to Gruenewald et al.’s (2013) study by identifying and discussing
specific and actionable next policy and research steps, as well as this study’s potential impact
on the current state of knowledge.
Research Implications and Considerations
Reviews of the terrorism research literature have regularly highlighted the paucity of original
data that inform analyses (Schmid and Jongman, 1988; Silke, 2001, 2004). In the most
recent review of the literature, Silke (2013: 34) noted: “[O]ne feels that a great deal
more needs to be done before research is consistently building on past work rather than
rehashing old data.” Although the use of inferential statistical methods is certainly on the
rise with relation to terrorism research, these studies typically tend to be based on terrorist
events rather than on the individual offenders. This is largely because of the data available
from the Global Terrorism Database. More recently however, there have been a handful
of large-N studies of terrorist group membership that primarily use descriptive statistics
(Gill and Horgan, in press; Horgan and Morrison, 2011; Magouirk, Atran, and Sageman,
2008; Reinares, 2004; Sageman, 2004). Gruenewald et al.’s (2013) article is a major next
step in the study of the individual terrorist. Their development of the U.S. Extremist
Crime Database (ECDB) provides a solid empirical basis from which inferential statistical
approaches to the study of extremists and most importantly extremist behavior can be
conducted.
Gruenewald et al.’s (2013) study highlights significant behavioral and personal dif-
ferences between far-right–inspired lone and group offenders. Although some of these
differences were expected based on their survey of research on lone-actor terrorism, they
neglected to mention that a few studies of different crimes have found broadly similar re-
sults. For example, Alarid, Buron, and Hochstetler’s (2009) study of robberies showed that
group offenders were more likely to be younger, unmarried, and less educated. In terms of
target selection, there was little difference between the difficulty levels of robberies chosen
by group and solo offenders, which runs counter to much theorizing concerning “strength
in numbers,” and offending (see Felson, Baumer, and Messner, 2000, for example). Using
vastly different samples, studies comparing lone and group rapists have found that the
former tended to be significantly older (Bijleveld and Hendriks, 2003; Hauffe and Porter,
2009; Ullman, 1999; Wright and West, 1981), significantly more likely to be married and
have children, significantly less likely to have a history of substance abuse (Hauffe and Porter,
2009), significantly more likely to have previous convictions and problematic personality
structures (Bijleveld and Hendriks, 2003), and significantly more likely to be employed
(Ullman, 1999). Hickle and Roe-Sepowitz’s (2010) study of female juvenile arsonists found
solo offenders more often came from unstable homes; more often experienced school diffi-
culties, behavioral problems, and negative emotions; and expressed suicidal thoughts more
regularly (the latter finding is particularly relevant to Gruenewald et al.’s study when we
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consider their finding that lone offenders were more likely to die in the commission of their
offense).
Block’s (1985, 1986) study of Chicago-based homicides illustrated that group offenders
were significantly younger than lone offenders. Cheatwood and Block’s (1990) study on
homicides in Baltimore also found a disproportionate number of juvenile offenders engaging
in homicides as members of groups rather than as individuals. In the most comprehensive of
such analyses, Clark (1995) analyzed data across nineU.S. cities. Again, group offenders were
significantly younger. Similar to Hauffe and Porter’s (2009) results (discussed previously),
lone offenders were less likely to have a history of substance abuse than group offenders.
Unlike research on robberies, group homicide offenders were more likely to have previous
criminal convictions (Clark, 1995). Aggregating a large number of crimes, VanMastrigt and
Farrington (2011) analyzed U.K. police data; group offenders were significantly younger
than lone offenders and tended to have more criminal convictions. This finding is common
when the offender sample is aggregated across crime types (Erickson, 1971; Hindelang,
1976; Reiss and Farrington, 1991). Collectively, these studies should raise future questions
about what factors drive these differences across crime types. For example, answers may
lie in individual decision making, gatekeeper selection effects, and group dynamics and
influences. The collective findings also suggest that some factors may be crime specific (e.g.,
previous convictions), whereas others may be crime general (e.g., age and mental illness).
These studies also highlight, from a policy and practitioner perspective, whether desistance
and disengagement from crime is a different process for solo and group offenders.
The importance of Gruenewald et al.’s (2013) study lies not only in its use of infer-
ential statistical methods and in its delineation between far-right–inspired lone and group
offenders, but also the findings have important implications for issues long debated within
the literature, particularly issues concerning mental illness and terrorist involvement, as well
as issues concerned with group processes.
In the 1970s, the first wave of studies on the individual terrorist offered psychopatholog-
ical interpretations that perceived terrorist behavior to be essentially deviant. An underlying
assumption in this research strand is that compulsion to join the militant organization, or
the vulnerability to recruitment, is inherent in those who become engaged in militancy.
Motivation to participate is therefore situated within the individual in isolation. To this end,
researchers have postulated deviant characteristics of the terrorist. For Victoroff (2005), this
field was “largely characterized by theoretical speculation based on subjective interpretation
of anecdotal observations” (p. 3). In the 1980s, psychoanalytic approaches (with a particular
emphasis on the concept of narcissism) largely replaced psychopathological explanations.
These findings are reasonably similar to the preceding assumptions of the terrorist personal-
ity being essentially abnormal but perceive this abnormality as determined by unconscious
drives and urges originating from childhood rather than inherent personality flaws.
Over the past 15 years or so, a growing awareness of the need to understand the group
process has come to fruition. This has largely been aided by empirical studies that have
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engaged in first-hand interviews and by the incorporation of theory from social psychology.
This stream of research has been successful at downplaying the role of personality andmental
health issues with regard to terrorist involvement to the extent that one noted academic, who
in the past championed psychoanalytical interpretations of terrorist motivation, argued that
“a clear consensus exists that it is not individual psychology, but group, organizational and
social psychology, that provides the greatest analytical power in understanding this complex
phenomenon” (Post, 2005: 7). Although the studies of the 1970s and 1980s were correctly
debunked on methodological grounds, Gruenewald et al.’s (2013) findings suggest that
the existing consensus that mental illness never plays a role in terrorism and that terrorist
behavior can be purely explained by group processes is likely to be a fallacy.
With regard to group processes, Gruenewald et al.’s (2013) study supports recent
work that has started to reexamine the role of group processes in terrorism. For example,
the debate has been widened by Taylor (2010: 121), who argued that “group-focused
causal accounts fail to offer sufficient explanations of the behaviors identified” in his case
studies, whereas Gill (2012) attempted to refine the nature of role-specific qualities and
group-based behavior. Although many studies of the individual terrorist are fixated with
understanding motive and/or radicalization (this is also true for media accounts if we
examine the coverage regarding the recent Boston Marathon bombings), Gruenewald et al.
instead focus on behavior. Their findings that lone offenders are significantly more likely
to have experience of the military and live alone also importantly provide insight into
capability. Group membership provides individuals not only the operational capabilities
necessary to perform a terrorist attack but also the mechanism for moral disengagement
(Gill, 2012). Research literature from military psychology has suggested that many factors
inhibit individuals from engaging in fatal violence against others. For example, Marshall
concluded that “the average and healthy individual . . . has such an inner and usually
unrealized resistance towards killing a fellow man that he will not of his own volition take
life if it is possible to turn away from that responsibility . . . at the vital point” (cited in
Grossman, 1995: 29). Absent a group setting, terrorist violence may be difficult to commit
for practical and psychological reasons. In the absence of a group, an individual may need
other factors to (a) provide security, (b) help overinhibitions against committing violence,
(c) help develop the necessary practical skills, and (d) finance an operation. Here, variables
found to be significant in the current study such as living alone at the time of the attack and
military training provide the capabilities to turn motivation into action for lone offenders.
This is also true for hypotheses that were unsupported, such as lone offenders being more
likely to be unemployed. Without a group to help an individual plan, prepare, and carry out
a successful attack, the lone offender must have a steady source of income. This observation
is highlighted in the case of Anders Breivik in Norway, who financed his operations through
several legal and illegal activities in the years before his attack and avoided delaying his attack
further because he was having liquidity issues and feared he could not (a) keep renting the
96 Criminology & Public Policy
Gil l and Corner
farm where he built his improvised explosive device and (b) rent a car for the operation
itself.
With regard to mental illness and terrorism, Gruenewald et al.’s (2013) finding that
more than 40% of lone offenders had previously been diagnosed with mental illness is
one of the most statistically significant findings from the multivariate analysis. Despite its
importance, this finding receives minimal attention in the concluding remarks and policy
implications. This may be born out of discrepancies across the literature concerning mental
illness and terrorism, leading to the current existing false dichotomy that an act of targeted
violence was either the actions of a terrorist or the actions of someone who was mentally
ill. Gruenewald et al. do suggest important methods for identifying diagnoses, but we hold
the opinion that future research should use mental illness as a central unit of analysis. In
doing so, it would provide a better understanding of the complexity of mental illness with
relation to terrorist behavior and provide the possibility to examine how the other variables
would affect and be affected by the offender suffering from mental illness. In other words,
the mental illness variable is likely to stem from several other variables accounted for in
the ECDB database and impact many other variables also. For example, research by Elisha,
Castle, and Hocking (2006) illustrated that social isolation is highly prevalent among those
diagnosed with a mental illness. Of their 3,800 observations of individuals diagnosed with
a psychotic illness, 58% were also characterized as being socially withdrawn. Butterworth
and Rodgers (2008) demonstrated that couples with at least one spouse diagnosed with a
mental illness suffer higher rates of marital disruption than non–mentally-ill couples.
Using mental illness as a central variable with relation to the criminogenic factors may
also be a promising approach. As Anderson (1997) explained, the symbiotic relationship
between mental illness and criminal behavior is complex. Comorbidity of mental illness
with other behaviors is well documented across the literature and includes substance abuse
(Todd et al., 2004) and violent and criminal convictions (Anderson, 1997). It is also a
common understanding in psychiatric practice (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual [DSM]
and International Classification of Diseases [ICD]). Gruenewald et al.’s (2013) study found
that 34% of lone offenders had substance abuse problems and that 61.7% had prior arrests.
Taking into consideration the complexities that comorbidity brings, it may be necessary in
the future to distinguish between lone offenders who were mentally ill and those who were
not to determine and compare the rates of substance abuse and criminal convictions, as well
as compare these with group actors.
Many different mental illnesses display impulsivity as a problem behavior (DSM and
ICD), which affects many aspects of living and may affect the attack types of offenders, as
well as the primary weapon usage. The current study found that 84.8% of lone offenders
used a gun, compared with 40.2% of group offenders. This finding is highly significant, but
if one takes into account the country that the data were taken from (the United States) and
the gun control laws, it could be hypothesized that lone offenders were more likely to use a
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gun because nearly half struggled with impulse control and guns are freely and immediately
available.
It is also interesting to note the potential link between the highly significant finding
that lone offenders were more likely to partake in a suicide mission compared with group
offenders given the higher levels of mental illness found in lone actors. This finding is
interesting because suicide risks are much higher in the mentally ill population, and if
non–mentally-ill lone actors were investigated separately, this figure may decrease to a value
approaching that of group-based offenders.
Finally in relation to mental illness, Gill, Horgan, and Deckert (in press), and many of
the group versus solo offender studies cited previously, also found the average age of lone
offenders to be older than that of group offenders. This finding may provide support for the
idea that a different temporal trajectory into criminality is at play for lone- and group-based
offenders. It may be necessary to consider and examine whether the increased age range is a
result of the later onset of mental illness. For example, military service personnel are at high
risk of developing posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Sundin et al., 2010), which again
may in part explain the highly significant discrepancies between lone and group offenders
Future Policy Considerations
Gruenewald et al. (2013) identified three policy recommendations that should be tailored
from preexisting policies to fit the problem of lone offenders. Importantly, Gruenewald
et al. make the point that lone offender attacks are preventable, which runs counter to
several current studies that have not had the benefit of the high-quality data sets or rigorous
methodologies that Gruenewald et al. used (Barnes, 2012; Michael, 2012; Simon, 2013).
The first recommendation is to increase intelligence partnerships between law enforce-
ment and other organizations such as military intelligence units and social service agencies.
This suggestion stems from the finding that lone offenders were significantly more likely to
have military experience and a history of mental illness. We suggest that this could go fur-
ther. The policy implications of our suggestions regarding the future study of mental illness
with relation to terrorism suggests using multiple agencies at numerous intervention stages
(social services, policing agencies, the courts, military organizations, psychiatric hospitals,
weapons providers, community programs, financial agencies, intelligence agencies, and the
media), which could all cooperate to aid in prevention and reduction efforts. The second
recommendation involves increasing technological surveillance, which spans a wide range
of functions including monitoring websites and chat rooms, collecting intelligence, creating
fake websites, building relationships with chat room moderators (and thereby increasing
guardianship), and countering extremist narratives. These behaviors, if applied correctly,
could also help prevent and disrupt online group-based offenders. The final recommenda-
tion is to sharpen threat assessment tools, which is similar to recommendations stemming
from broadly similar studies of school shooters and politically motivated assassins (Fein and
Vossekuil, 1999; Vossekuil et al., 2002).
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The significant behavioral differences between lone and group offenders found using
the ECDB data suggest the need for a tailored response to both subgroups. It also serves
to raise further questions about whether these differences hold true for other ideological
motivations.Gill,Horgan, andDeckert’s (in press) study suggests that identifiable behavioral
differences exist among al-Qaeda–inspired, extreme right-wing, and single-issue lone-actor
terrorists. The ECDB data also focus solely on offenders who commit fatal attacks. It would
be interesting to observe what patterns hold for those who committed attacks that caused
no fatalities as well as those whose plots were interrupted preattack. Finally, as mentioned,
the ECDB data focus on only U.S.-based offenders, which leads to the question of whether
this group of offenders is more likely to use firearms because of the smaller opportunity
costs involved.
In conclusion, hopefully the highly important results found in Gruenewald et al.’s
(2013) study will lead to a greater comparative examination of these issues across ideological
domains and geographic boundaries.
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